

# **How to Win Friends and Influence People: Planning Perception Management at the Division and Corps Level**

**A Monograph  
by  
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## **Abstract**

How to Win Friends and Influence People: Planning Perception Management at the Division and Corps Level by Major Noelle J. Briand, US Army, 49 pages.

We have all heard the saying that "Perception is Reality". This statement is especially salient when discussing military operations in a post conflict environment. The implications of the perceptions of the local populace during the transition period from major combat operations to a stable, steady state environment, the global information environment, threats from insurgents and the presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) creates operational conditions rarely experienced before. Corps and division commanders are now faced with the increasingly complex challenges of conducting influence operations and managing perceptions on an order of magnitude their predecessors have rarely encountered.

Influence operations have received a great deal of attention in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Our nation's leadership has realized the importance of offensive and defensive information and the criticality of its collaborative use. Although strategic and operational information activities have increased, the emphasis on perception management at the division and corps level has been limited.

In order for corps and divisions to be effective and achieve lasting, measurable results in a post-conflict environment, they must establish a secure environment, foster the legitimacy of the host nation government, restore essential services and infrastructure while simultaneously generating goodwill and protecting friendly forces. To accomplish these objectives, division and corps commanders must master the art and science of managing perceptions by employing influence operations as a weapon system.

This monograph proposes a model for tactical perception management and influence operations in the corps and the division. The model addresses the organization and training of perception management teams, as well as research and analysis, targeting, message and material development, implementation and evaluation. The model is designed to operate within the existing framework, including personnel manning, of either an airborne or heavy corps.

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## Chapter One

### Introduction

*“To capture the enemy’s entire army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a regiment, a company, or a squad is better than to destroy them. For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence. Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy. Next best is to disrupt his alliances by diplomacy. The next best is to attack his army. And the worst policy is to attack cities.”*

Sun Tsu  
The Art of War

We have all heard the saying that “Perception is Reality”. This statement is especially salient when discussing military operations in a post conflict environment. The implications of the perceptions of the local populace during the transition period from major combat operations to a stable, steady state environment, the global information environment, threats from insurgents and the presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) creates operational conditions rarely experienced before. Corps and division commanders are now faced with the increasingly complex challenges of conducting influence operations and managing perceptions on an order of magnitude their predecessors have rarely encountered. In addition, the challenges of conducting influence operations and managing perceptions are further magnified the lower in echelon they are executed, due to constraints in personnel, resourcing, training and lack of emphasis placed on perception management and influence operations by US Army divisions and corps.

Influence operations have received a great deal of attention in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Our nation’s leadership has realized the importance of offensive and defensive information and the criticality of its collaborative use. The National Security Council, in concert with the Department of Defense and other US government agencies, is leading the national level application of information through strategic influence (SI) campaigns<sup>1</sup>. The combatant commanders are

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Special Operations Command. *Joint Psychological Vision*. (McDill Air Force Base, Florida: U.S. Special Operations Command, 2000). 2.

charged with the military portion of regional operational influence campaigns. Corps and division level commanders are, by default, charged with planning and executing tactical influence operations, most commonly referred to as psychological operations (PSYOP).

In order for corps and divisions to be effective and achieve lasting, measurable results in a post-conflict environment, they must establish a secure environment, foster the legitimacy of the host nation government and restore essential services and infrastructure, while simultaneously generating goodwill and protecting friendly forces. To accomplish these objectives, division and corps commanders must master the art and science of managing perceptions by employing influence operations as a weapon system. Although inherently non-lethal in nature, influence operations are a weapon system in the corps and division's respective arsenals. When military force is no longer the compelling element, information and its communication to the target audience becomes a primary weapon. Effective management of the perceptions of the populace can account for significant advances in the commander's goals. Conversely, disregard for or mismanagement of perceptions can lead to unintended consequences or mission failure. Thus, exploiting the informational element of national power will prove critical for success in future operations.

Corps and division commanders require effective perception management in order to effectively accomplish their missions. In order to do this, non-psychological operations personnel must understand the importance and employment of influence operations as a weapon system to manage perceptions in a post conflict environment. War planners at the division and corps must understand and apply the perception management model to their own campaign planning processes. Planners must include the human factors element, and the often forgotten "social" aspect of war<sup>2</sup>, into their planning of post conflict operations in order to affect the attitudes, values, beliefs, and behavior of the populace.

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<sup>2</sup> Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," in *The Causes of War and Other Essays*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 138.

Influencing the populace, although critical, is exceedingly difficult in an increasingly complex, uncertain, and dynamic global security environment. This complexity has lead to the US military now facing a myriad of non-traditional operational challenges. Significant among these non-traditional challenges are those challenges posed by the global information environment (GIE), which has created a pervasive and instantaneous media presence delivering instant, unanalyzed information to audiences across the globe.

Additional challenges to influencing the populace include growing international economic inequities and deteriorating environmental conditions, resulting in growing desperation and resentment in populations around the globe. Increasing threats from non-state actors and a blurring of military responsibilities have further complicated the challenges the US Army faces. US national interests, be they security, economic or humanitarian, are increasingly threatened. The end of the Cold War created new problems and possibilities for the once bi-polar world. Although the threat of major conflict continues to diminish in the near term, military operations other than war (MOOTW) are increasing in number, frequency, and duration.

These additional challenges are essential for the division and corps leadership to understand as the resulting conditions have a direct impact on the populations with which the military will interact. In order to secure the support of the populace it will be essential to empathize. It is not only important for commanders and planners to understand the local environment, but also the regional and international environments. In today's high-tech, information driven environment, where geographical borders no longer limit conflict, commanders and planners must frame their operations, and their resultant consequences in the global context.

The increased emphasis on stability and support operations, humanitarian assistance, and nation building has resulted in a blurring of military responsibilities. What was once seen as the purview of other government agencies, namely the Department of State and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), is increasingly a military issue with the primary actor being



the US Army. Although, US Army Special Operations Forces have long been engaged in operations other than war, stability and support operations (SASO) is a new mission and a new environment for conventional US Army forces. In addition to the traditional military operations other than war which the US Army finds itself executing, post conflict operations have emerged as a separate and distinct mission.

Post conflict operations do display many of the same characteristics of military operations other than war, but are different in one primary aspect; the psychological condition of the populace. The psychological condition results from the conditions and dissatisfaction preceding the conflict, combined with the high expectations generated as a result of the US/coalition victory. US involvement in post conflict operations most often creates high expectations on the part of the affected populace. Managing these expectations is central to achieving post conflict objectives.

The psychological condition of the population and the resulting perceptions, or misperceptions, require division and corps commanders to ensure the total integration of perception management in all aspects of planning, resourcing, and execution of post conflict operations. Additionally, commanders must ensure the synchronization of their perception management activities with all actors in their area of responsibility; military, civilian, US and host nation. Failure to effectively address perception management allows the insurgent elements and non-governmental organizations to exploit the psychological condition of the populace, friendly and belligerent, to the detriment of US/coalition goals.

Doctrine and operational concepts for conducting influence operations currently exist for joint psychological operations at the operational and strategic level<sup>3</sup>. At the strategic level, the Joint Psychological Operations Support Element (JPSE) supports national influence campaigns.

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<sup>3</sup>US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2003). Department of the Army Field Manual 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2000), discuss psychological operations at the strategic and operational level. Psychological operations at the corps level and below are considered to be tactical due to the presumably limited scope of the target audiences.

The JPSE supports the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the combatant commanders by planning, coordinating, integrating, and, on order, conducting trans-regional psychological operations to promote U.S. goals and objectives. Assigned to United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) it supports the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), regional combatant commanders (RCCs), the Joint Staff and interagency activities as directed by the SECDEF. It provides professional, commercial quality analysis, planning, program development, and prototype development, while developing DoD supporting plans, programs, and action recommendations to support national and interagency information initiatives.

At the operational level, a Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) is formed from the appropriate, regionally aligned Psychological Operations Battalion located in the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne). The force is a joint special operations task force composed of a headquarters and tactical, operational, and dissemination PSYOP assets to carry out a specific psychological operation or prosecute psychological operations in support of a theater campaign or other operation.<sup>4</sup>

Both the JPSE and the JPOTF are organizations comprised of PSYOP experts, both civilian and military, who are extensively trained in the art and science of influence. They also receive in-depth training in cross cultural communications and the language and culture of their designated regions. Furthermore, they are robustly resourced by USSOCOM. Support for planning and conducting influence operations at the division and corps level, however, is not as comprehensive.

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<sup>4</sup> FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations, US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2001) The 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, contains four regionally oriented PSYOP battalions. 1<sup>st</sup> POB (SOUTHCOM), 5<sup>th</sup> POB(PACOM), 6<sup>th</sup> POB (EUCOM) and 8<sup>th</sup> POB (CENTCOM)

Although doctrine, in the form of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), does exist for the employment of tactical psychological operations forces<sup>5</sup>, there is no doctrine to guide the planning of influence operations for US Army corps and divisions. Attached PSYOP forces at the corps and division level are capable of producing and disseminating limited print products and loudspeaker broadcasts. They are not responsible for developing a coordinated and synchronized perception management campaign for the division or corps. Doctrine drives training, education, and planning in the US Army. As such, with the absence of doctrine, resources, training, and emphasis do not match perception management requirements at the corps and division level.

Corps and division commanders are not properly organized or adequately resourced with personnel or other required resources for planning, integrating, and managing effective influence operations. Corps and division commanders have limited staff personnel trained in the art and science of influence, cross cultural communications and linguistics. At best, a corps or division will have two trained and experienced perception managers assigned to the staff. These two personnel will be a psychological operations officer (39B) and a non-commissioned officer (37F). These individuals are normally assigned to the G-3 section. Although they are trained in perception management, they typically spend the majority of their time and energy accomplishing other tasks unrelated to perception management and influence operations. For example, the NCO is often assigned the duties of the G-3 Plans NCOIC and the officer is often dual hatted as the civil affairs officer in the absence of a FA 39C officer. A change in organization of the staff could mitigate this shortcoming in personnel.

This shortfall in doctrine and personnel manning is further exacerbated when corps and divisions are required to operate in a post conflict environment. In a post conflict environment, winning the support and allegiance of the people becomes the primary objective and public opinion the center of gravity. Efforts must actively focus on reinforcing the legitimacy of the

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<sup>5</sup> By doctrine, one tactical psychological operations battalion is allocated to each corps and one tactical psychological operations company is allocated to each division.

host nation government by creating conditions which psychologically reassure the populace of their efficacy. Additionally, efforts must be focused on the neutralization and de-legitimization of the insurgents. Information is the key to gaining and maintaining legitimacy and neutralizing the insurgents. Operational effectiveness of post conflict efforts will diminish if perception management is not addressed and integrated in post conflict planning. On the other hand, a targeted, effective information campaign can pay huge rewards in efforts to win the support of the population in support of US/coalition goals.

This monograph addresses the need for the integration of perception management in post conflict planning by suggesting a reorganization of the corps and division staff, specifically by establishing a perception management team to plan, integrate, and assess influence operations. The paper seeks to provide a feasible, acceptable, and suitable solution to the current shortcoming. The proposed solution supports a campaign quality Army with a joint and expeditionary mindset. It operates within the current personnel and resource constraints of the transformational Army we find ourselves in today. It offers a potential solution by managing the organic assets of the division or corps in a manner as to form an effective perception management team capable of planning effective influence campaigns. It capitalizes on the human intangibles of military operations, such as history, culture, religion, and ideology. It also provides a framework to optimize potential additional assets from echelon above corps (EAC) elements, the other services and other US government agencies (OGA). The proposal ensures the perception management team at the corps and division level is a key enabler of the joint team.

This monograph begins by defining key terms essential to embarking on a discussion of perception management. Next, by describing the contemporary operating environment and the characteristics and requirements of post conflict operations it articulates the need for effective perception management planning and integration at the division and corps. The consequences of not integrating perception management into operations is key to the discussion. Deficiencies in US Army doctrine related to influence operations and perception management will be reviewed

and any strengths and weaknesses highlighted. Finally, the contributions, constraints, and planning considerations of influence operations as a weapon system at the corps level and below during post-conflict operations will be addressed.

This monograph will answer three questions. In order to define the problem the first question is the requirement for influence operations in the current operational environment. Second, it must be determined if the warfighter has sufficient means and authorities to execute effective influence operations during post-conflict operations. Finally, how do influence operations achieve effects when integrated with operational planning and the targeting process?

Following an analysis of perception management planning and integration requirements at the division and corps level during post conflict operations, this monograph concludes by proposing a model for tactical perception management and influence operations in the corps and the division. The model addresses the organization and training of perception management teams, as well as research and analysis, targeting, message and material development, implementation and evaluation. The model is designed to operate within the existing framework, including personnel manning, of either an airborne or heavy corps.

### **Establishing a Common Ground**

*"The military services, in their preoccupation with technology, major weapon systems, and the big war, tend to neglect low-cost approaches to enhancing operational effectiveness, especially at the lower end of the conflict spectrum; and they tend to regard political-psychological warfare as some else's business."*<sup>6</sup>

Before embarking on any discussion, it is necessary to first establish a common understanding of terms and concepts. This is particularly the case with topics as nascent and emerging as information operations, influence operations, perception management, persuasion, and public information. With the increased attention given to recent military operations, these

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<sup>6</sup> Carnes R. Lord, "The Psychological Dimension in National Strategy," in Frank R. Barnett and Carnes Lord, eds, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the US Approach* (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1989), 27.

terms are often thrown about carelessly and used erroneously, usually with negative consequences. For clarity, joint definitions are used whenever available.

Joint doctrine defines perception management as actions to convey or deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning. In addition, it includes effecting intelligence systems and leaders at all levels, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the US' objectives. In various ways, perception management combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception, and psychological operations.<sup>7</sup>

At the joint level, perception management may be used interchangeably with psychological operations (PSYOP). Psychological operations are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the US' objectives<sup>8</sup> Psychological operations deal only in the truth in order to maintain legitimacy and the continuing power to influence.

Taking psychological operations one step further, we evolve to influence operations. Influence operations refer to the employment of psychological operations, military deception, and operations security (OPSEC) capabilities to influence foreign decision makers or groups and to protect friendly decision making.<sup>9</sup>

More encompassing than influence operations, information operations (IO) are actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems.<sup>10</sup> Information operations is an integrating function which

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<sup>7</sup> JP 1-02. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*  
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/p/03997.html> accessed 08 April 2004.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid

<sup>9</sup> US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3600.1 *Information Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2001) 2.

<sup>10</sup> JP 1-02

synchronizes electronic warfare, computer network attack, psychological operations, military deception and operations security to affect or defend information and information systems to influence adversary decision-making.<sup>11</sup>

The goal of information operations is to gain and maintain information superiority, allowing commanders to seize, retain, and exploit the operational initiative. Information operations facilitate more effective decision-making and faster execution of operations. In addition, IO involves constant efforts to deny adversaries the ability to detect and respond to friendly operations, while simultaneously retaining and enhancing friendly freedom of action. When expeditiously exploited, IO provides a potent advantage that facilitates rapid military success with minimal casualties.<sup>12</sup> Effective IO and information management allow commanders to take advantage of opportunities, while denying adversary commanders the information needed to make timely and accurate decisions or leading them to make decisions favorable to friendly forces.<sup>13</sup> In effect, information operations are information management.

Information management provides relevant information to the right person at the right time, in a usable form, to facilitate situational awareness and decision-making. It uses procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information.<sup>14</sup>

Webster's dictionary defines influence as the act or power of producing an effect without apparent exertion of force or direct exercise of command. It is the power to cause an effect in indirect or intangible ways.<sup>15</sup> Hence, in military terms it is causing an effect, either physical or moral, by a gradual process. Two terms, with vastly different connotations, are commonly associated with influence; control and persuasion.

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<sup>11</sup> US Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-13, *Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2003) 1-2.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 3-1.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, 3-2.

<sup>14</sup> US Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2001) 11-28.

<sup>15</sup> Meriam Webster Online. Internet. Available from <http://www.m-w.com/>. Accessed 06 February 2004.

To persuade is to cause someone to do something by means of argument, reasoning or entreaty. It can mean winning someone over to a course of action by an inducement or reasoning. Additionally, it can mean making someone believe something or convince them of something. Persuasion is the act of persuading or the state of being persuaded.<sup>16</sup>

A more pejorative term often associated with information operations and perception management is propaganda. Although propaganda has pejorative overtones, by definition it is not a nefarious word. Propaganda is simply the systematic propagation of a given doctrine or of allegations reflecting its views and interests.<sup>17</sup>

Although many of the above definitions seem very similar, they are distinctly different. The most important difference is the echeloning of the terms psychological operations, influence operations and information operations. Each term is respectively more encompassing with psychological operations being the narrowest in scope and information operations being the broadest. The other critical factor is that perception management is synonymous with psychological operations and these two terms can be used interchangeably.

When discussing the operational battlespace in a post conflict situation it is imperative to include information, public opinion, perceptions, and attitudes of adversary leadership and of significant population groups within and beyond the battlespace.<sup>18</sup> The human dimension of the battlespace includes demographic, cultural, social, and psychological aspects. Understanding and considering the social aspect of conflict is as essential as considering the military capabilities of the adversary.

In order to conduct research and compile this monograph, assumptions must be made. The basic assumption which underlies this monograph is that the environment which exists in the transition phase between major combat operations and a steady state environment is very similar to the conditions which exist in an insurgency. The author's research confirmed that asymmetric

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<sup>16</sup> Meriam-Webster

<sup>17</sup> Ibid

<sup>18</sup> JP 2-01.3



threats and the role of the population as the center of gravity drive planning for influence operations in a post conflict environment Just as they do in a counterinsurgency environment.

This monograph focuses primarily on perception management and psychological operations. For the purpose of limiting the scope of this monograph information operations and the additional perception management components of deception and operational security are not addressed.. In addition, the information contained herein is restricted to the unclassified level. All information presented within is accessible to the general public. As such, some capabilities available to psychological operations forces and perception managers will not be discussed.

## Chapter Two

### The Operating Environment

*"The armed services today have to be versed not alone in war but in government, politics, the humanities – economics, social, and spiritual."*

*Bernard Baruch<sup>19</sup>*

*"The future ain't what it used to be."*

*Yogi Berra*

The current global security environment which the US Army currently finds itself operating in is increasingly complex, uncertain, and dynamic. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), rogue states, ethnic conflict, organized crime, and terrorism threaten peace and stability around the globe. Convinced of the futility of challenging our forces directly, adversaries are increasingly using asymmetric means to engage us. All of this is occurring under the watchful eye of the global media who is relaying every action to national and international audiences. The global information environment (GIE), characterized by a pervasive media presence, provides instant unfiltered information to audiences worldwide. Military operations are now reported in real time. Media representatives are embedded with military units and often the viewing public learns of actions and consequences simultaneously with the commander and soldier on the ground.

In addition, growing international economic inequity and deteriorating environmental conditions are raising levels of desperation and resentment. Threats from non-state actors, including terrorists and multi-national corporations, are increasing. Military responsibilities are blurring. Nation building, strengthening democratic institutions, and promoting human rights was once seen as the purview of the Department of State and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Recently, the military has been increasingly called upon to accomplish these tasks. The primary actor has been the US Army. US national interests, be they security, economic or humanitarian, are increasingly threatened. The end of the Cold War has created new

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<sup>19</sup> Inscription on a plaque on the wall of the Baruch auditorium, Eisenhower Hall, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington D.C..

problems and possibilities for the once bi-polar world. The threat of major conflict continues to diminish and military operations other than war (MOOTW) are increasing in number, frequency and duration.

In the last thirty years the US military has engaged in only three major combat operations; Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and most recently, Operation Iraqi Freedom. All three of these combat operations were measured in months. Conversely, the US has engaged in more than 25 major and minor operations other than war. These operations have been measured in years. In addition to the number of these operations, the frequency and duration have been increasing as well.

Of the 55 peace operations the United Nations has mounted since 1945, 41 (or nearly 81 percent) began after 1989. Fifteen are still underway.<sup>20</sup> The US's involvement in these post Cold War interventions has been increasing in number and scope from the 1993 humanitarian assistance mission in Somalia, to current nation building operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>21</sup> In addition to ongoing combat and stability and support operations, the US Army is decisively engaged in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), now referred to as the War on Terrorism or WOT.

Although US Army Special Operations Forces have long been engaged in stability operations, stability and support operations (SASO) are a new mission and environment for conventional US Army forces. In addition to the traditional operations other than war, which the US Army finds itself executing, post conflict operations have emerged as an additional separate and distinct mission. Post conflict operations are often a combination of several stability operations that are dictated by the unique conditions and requirements of each situation. These types of operations are listed in Table 2-1.

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<sup>20</sup> Dobbins, James, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger and Anga Timilsina, *America's Role in Nation Building From Germany to Iraq* Rand, 2003, pg xv

<sup>21</sup> Following major combat operations, both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom transitioned to post conflict stability and support operations as a component of the nation building effort.

Table 2-1<sup>22</sup>

<u>Stability Operations</u>		
Peace Operations	Foreign Internal Defense	Security Assistance
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance	Support to Insurgencies	
Support to Counterdrug Operations	Combating Terrorism	
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations	Arms Control	Show of Force

### **Post Conflict Operations**

Successful combat operations are designed to bring an end to a war. War termination does not, however, end the US Army's involvement. When hostilities cease, units transition to post conflict operations. This was demonstrated recently in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. Major combat operations were over in a matter of months. However, years and months later the US Army is still actively engaged in both theaters. Historically, successful post conflict operations are characterized with a duration of not less than five years<sup>23</sup>.

Post conflict operations are also characterized by a transition from the military achieving military objectives to the military focusing on political objectives. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and intra-governmental organizations (IGOs) populate the new battlespace. Non-combatants now encompass seemingly everyone, making identification of the belligerents all but impossible. Rules of engagement (ROE) are increasingly restrictive. Cross-cultural communications skills become more important than battle drills. In an environment where the people are the center of gravity, the use of force is no longer the primary means of persuasion. Communicating information effectively across cultural boundaries replaces the rifle.

<sup>22</sup> FM 3-0 *Operations*, 9-1.

<sup>23</sup> Dobbins, pg. xxiv.

Communication becomes difficult among soldiers as well as cultures. During post conflict operations troops are often dispersed across a greater operational area than during combat operations due to the often decreased troop strength. Additionally, the tight command and control characteristic of combat formations, must be lessened in post conflict operations where the value of face to face communications with the populace often outweighs the potential security risks of dispersion. The element of control, along with the authority to exercise the use of force which existed during combat operations, is removed.

At the same time, an absence of civil law and order and no outlet for the disenfranchised individuals and organizations, leads to an increased security risk and therefore a need for increased force protection measures. This places the commander in a tenuous situation where he must balance the risks to troops with the need to interact with the populace in a non-threatening and reassuring manner. Force protection is always the number one priority, but excessive protective measures may limit the force's ability to create the perception of a secure and stable environment, which is the first step to achieving post conflict goals.

Another objective of post conflict operations is the restoration of infrastructure and essential services. Often there is widespread destruction or decay of physical and social infrastructure and institutions, along with the collapse of civil infrastructure as a result of combat operations. In post conflict scenarios the populace often faces less reliable essential services and infrastructure than before hostilities commenced. There may be a significant number of displaced persons, as well as increasing health risks due to disease, epidemics, or environmental degradation.

Post conflict operations require close cooperation with United Nations agencies, international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, and non-governmental organizations<sup>24</sup>. Non-governmental organizations are a key element in effective

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<sup>24</sup>Chris Seiple, *The US Military/NGO relationship in Humanitarian Intervention* (Peacekeeping Institute, Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College 1996), v.

perception management in post conflict situations. NGOs are often in an area prior to the entrance of US forces and most often remain long after US forces depart. These organizations are independent and grass roots focused. They have a variety of affiliations and agendas. Often they are cooperative and accommodating, other times they are not.

Regardless of their political agendas or their level of skepticism or disdain of the military, NGOs are necessary actors in a post conflict environment. Understanding them and cultivating a positive relationship will prove lucrative during perception management operations. NGOs often have excellent access to the local populace, and the people's trust as well. Having the NGOs on board to support and communicate your message can be very effective. Conversely, an adversarial relationship is often damaging to perception management efforts. Efforts should be made to establish mutually supporting relationships with NGOs which will result in portraying a united front in support of the host nation's legitimacy.

### **Post Conflict Objectives**

US Army division and corps planners can use perception management campaigns to facilitate the accomplishment of five primary objectives in a post conflict environment. Those objectives include; establish a secure environment, protect the force, foster the legitimacy of the host nation government, restore essential services and infrastructure and, generate goodwill. Carefully packaged and placed information can also be used to combat fears and misinformation in a post conflict environment. It can ensure that the local populace hears and sees the truth about what is actually happening.

In addition, media presence increases and the populace's psychological need for reassurance and information increases correspondingly. The population has been through an intense experience during the combat phase of operations and is psychologically vulnerable during the transition to a secure, steady state environment. The population is simultaneously optimistic, cynical and fearful. The transition period is characterized by a time of high expectations. Many in the population believe that once the US has been victorious there will be

instant resolution of latent issues and pre-existing conditions. As is well known though, instantaneous solutions to long term problems don't just happen.

Establishing a secure environment is the first essential task in post conflict operation. Perception management helps accomplish this objective by first filling the information void which exists post conflict. Effectively placed information will convey a sense of liberation versus occupation, psychologically reassure and comfort the local populace, provide hope and demonstrate resolve and commitment by the US to establish a safe and secure environment. Simultaneously, the actions of the corps and division must substantiate the claims of any information activities. The populace must hear, then see that US forces are creating a safe and secure environment and not just concerned with force protection of US/coalition forces. Awareness on the part of the populace is essential.

Fostering the legitimacy of the host nation government is the ultimate objective of post conflict operations. Institution building campaigns must cultivate a positive public opinion about the government. The campaign must be flexible and reliable in order to mitigate any negative consequences of host nation actions and events which will most likely occur as the new government establishes itself and begins to assert its authority. The host nation must take an active role in this process. US/coalition efforts must focus additionally on developing the internal capacity of the host nation government to conduct their own institution building and public relations campaigns.

Restoring essential services and infrastructure provides concrete evidence of US resolve and commitment to the host nation. As services are gradually restored, it is essential to keep the public informed of the progress. Additionally it is also critical to continually inform the populace of what they can do to assist in the restoration. The populace should also be told what is planned to be accomplished. The population should be then told about what is being accomplished while it is being done. Finally, they should be reminded of the accomplishment when it is complete, reinforcing promises made and promises kept.

Perception management tasks, tied to objectives, for post conflict are listed below in Table 2-2.

### **Perception Management Tasks for Post Conflict**

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#### **Establish a secure and stable environment**

- Explain mission
  - Demonstrate commitment
  - Pass non-interference instructions to populace
  - Undermine legitimacy of remaining malcontents or insurgents
  - Provide a non-threatening means of communication
  - Provide a conduit to disseminate information
  - Limit effectiveness of hostile propaganda
  - Decrease rumors and counter disinformation
  - Promote recognition and avoidance of unexploded ordnance (UXO)
  - Make populace aware of areas and routes rendered safe
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#### **Protect the force**

- Explain mission
  - Pass non-interference messages to populace
  - Publish and disseminate consequences
  - Demonstrate US resolve/commitment
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#### **Promote legitimacy of host nation government**

- Improve popular support for host nation government
  - Discredit insurgent forces with neutral groups
  - Project favorable image of host nation government
  - Support host nation programs which protect populace from insurgent activities
  - Establish institution building campaigns for government organizations
  - Forestall the development of false expectations
  - Increase effectiveness of local police force
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#### **Restore essential services and infrastructure**

- Publicize restoration programs
  - Publicize significant accomplishments of restoration progress
  - Encourage empathy between the HN military, security forces, police and populace
  - Foster a positive public image of HN police force
  - Forestall the development of false expectations
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Although post conflict operations display many of the same characteristics of operations other than war, there are differences in post conflict operations. Unlike other types of stability operations, the US/coalition has been a combatant immediately prior. The US is not simply there to render assistance. The population may not see the US combat operations as legitimate. The psychological condition of the population as a result of combat operations and the resulting perceptions and expectations require division and corps commanders to ensure the total



integration of perception management in all aspects of the planning, resourcing and execution of post conflict operations. Additionally, commanders must ensure the synchronization of their perception management activities with all interagency actors in their area of responsibility.

Perception management is especially critical to commanders at the corps and division level while engaged in post conflict operations. When military force is no longer the compelling element, information and its communication to the target audience becomes a primary tool. Perception management is the objective and influence operations is the weapon system. Although not inherently lethal in nature, effective management of the perceptions of the target audience can account for significant advances towards the commander's goals. Conversely, disregard of or mismanagement of perception can lead to unintended consequences or mission failure.

Commanders at the corps level and below have three added challenges that directly impact perception management in a post-conflict environment. First, it is at this critical time of transition between major combat operations and stability and support operations that effective communications and perception management increase in operational importance. Information and its conveyance is far more important during the transition between major combat operations and a secure steady state than it is during combat operations.

In order to achieve maximum effectiveness each soldier must be prepared and motivated to carry out face-to-face communication in order to persuade the populace. As a warrior diplomat every soldier must have the interpersonal skills and cultural awareness to justify persuasively his actions and those of his unit when he comes in contact with the population. He must be able to communicate three to five logical reasons to those he interacts with because he is the first and primary communicator to the populace.

Second, as the requirements for influence operations increase in number and significance, the resources, funding, authority, and forces decrease. Commanders have been slow to understand the value of non-lethal weapon systems to set conditions and facilitate the

achievement of objectives. Perception management efforts at the corps and division level are being undermanned and under-resourced. Until recently, the PSYOP officer positions at corps and division were considered non-branch qualifying, and as such were either unfilled or filled with the least qualified candidates. In 2002, all corps and division PSYOP officer positions became branch qualifying jobs. However, resistance remains in the PSYOP community to fill these positions with highly talented officers, as the billets are not considered as desirable as assignments within the PSYOP GROUP. Promotion board results are yet to yield a metric to confirm or refute this perception.

Finally, more often than not, the planners and subject matter experts with the institutional knowledge, cultural expertise, and the operational experience in perception management are re-deployed from the theater just when they are beginning to make an impact. The Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF), if established during combat operations, is usually dramatically scaled down or dismantled and re-deployed in its entirety at the cessation of hostilities. Such was the case for recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq<sup>25</sup>. This void in trained perception managers places the responsibility on the organizational staff of the corps and division to plan, integrate and execute tactical and operational level perception management.

Although the JPOTF is usually not an asset of the corps<sup>26</sup> during combat operations, its mere existence and operation in the AOR provides the corps with limited perception management capability. The JPOTF also provides the division or corps PSYOP officer with a source of information, analysis, access, and possibly products. When absent there is no unifying force for perception management.

The challenges posed by a post conflict environment, as well as the conditions created in the current global security environment, dictate the need for a perception management team at the

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<sup>25</sup> The JTF-7 Commander recognized this shortfall during post conflict operations in Iraq. The JPOTF, which had been redeployed in June 2003, redeployed to Iraq in November 2003 to provide perception management. The JPOTF however, remains subordinate to USCENTCOM.

<sup>26</sup> Doctrinally, a corps is the lowest echelon of unit which may have a POT. This is rarely seen as the JPOTF usually remains a theater asset under the control of the combatant commander.

corps and division level. In order for commanders to establish a secure environment, foster the legitimacy of the host nation government, restore essential services and infrastructure, while at the same time protecting the force and generating goodwill the human intangibles of military operations, must be understood, analyzed, and exploited.

## Chapter Three

### The Perception Management Team<sup>27</sup>

*“The memorable events of history are the visible effects of the invisible changes of human thought.”*

**Gustave Lebon,  
The Crowd<sup>28</sup>**

The objective of the perception management team at the corps and division level during post conflict operations is to assist the commander, planners, targeteers, and operators in understanding and exploiting the perceptual and behavioral context of missions and the operational battlespace. The goal of their efforts is to achieve desirable changes in competitor, adversary, and local populace behaviors that enable the accomplishment of the division and corps objectives. The perception management team recommends both information-based and kinetic methods to influence behaviors and manage target audience perceptions. In addition, the team develops quantifiable measures of effectiveness in order to evaluate the success of their actions.

In order to achieve these objectives, the perception management team must determine the main influences on the motivations, decision-making and resultant behaviors of key leaders and key communicators in the target audience (local populace, remaining malcontents, media etc). They must identify the conditions and key factors that produce these influences. They must take into account the culture, institutions and organizational behavior specific to the operational environment. The team must provide operationally relevant analytical products to the commander, planners, targeteers, and operators. These products must focus on achieving desirable behavioral changes in the target audience by exploiting influence susceptibilities.

The perception management team must be responsive to the commander's and planner's behavioral analysis requirements. In turn, the team must develop human behavior collection

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<sup>27</sup> This concept is derived from a briefing given by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center *Behavioral Influences Analysis Overview*, 09 December 2003.

<sup>28</sup> LeBon, Gustave, *The Crowd* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997) 33.

requirements. The team conducts research, data mining and intelligence analysis. The team does not operate, control or direct actions and initiatives.

The team uses a process of understanding, assessing, producing, and evaluating. They must understand the actors within the social, political, historical, geographical, religious, and cultural contexts. This includes understanding the beliefs, values, emotions, motivations, fears, and superstitions of the audience. Different cultures have different views on relationships which also must be understood. These relationships include:

- God and man
- Individual and the group
- The citizen and the state
- Parents and children
- Husband and wife

Additionally, there are different views on the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These are fundamental differences, established over centuries and well entrenched, which must be understood in order to effectively manage perceptions in a post conflict scenario.<sup>29</sup>

Once the PM team has achieved a solid understanding of the groups and individuals in the operational area they must assess the vulnerabilities and susceptibility in order to plan influence operations. Vulnerabilities are those perceived unfulfilled needs in the target audience, and this weakness can be exploited. Susceptibility is the degree to which a target audience will be affected by and respond to a given theme, symbol or message. It is necessary to identify the target audience's level of cohesion by identifying tensions, fissures, and divisions. This identification will in turn identify the target audience's centers of gravity, critical information capabilities and vulnerabilities. Finally, the perception management team must understand the

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<sup>29</sup> Huntington, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilizations*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, 33.

target audience's assessment of the situation, as well as their desired end state and minimal acceptable outcome of the post-conflict environment. Identifying these weaknesses, styles, tendencies, and perceptual patterns will provide the framework to begin developing a perception management campaign.

Understanding also includes knowledge about how the audience communicates. What are their most used information channels? What are their most trusted means of communications? How accessible are the means of communication? All of these questions frame the perception management team's input to the campaign plan.

Developing a PM campaign begins with producing recommendations for exploitation of the identified susceptibilities. These recommendations must take into account the accessibility of the target population's susceptibility to US messages, the likely response to the information and possible undesirable and unintended consequences.

The PM team must continuously evaluate and reassess the environment, adjusting their recommendations to meet current and future needs. Objective assessment is critical to the continuing effectiveness of the perception management campaign. Post-conflict operations are long duration and assumptions and observations made initially will change over time. Although seemingly complex and resource intensive, perception management activities will make significant contributions to the effectiveness of post conflict operations.

### **Contributions**

Corps and divisions should form perception management teams to facilitate accomplishment of the commander's objectives. Perception management teams can be key enablers of the joint team. Corps are particularly well suited for establishing perception management teams, as well as executing post conflict operations, because they are not fixed organizations and operate routinely with joint and multinational forces. Corps commanders are comfortable controlling assets not habitually associated with the corps and possess a robust nucleus of the combat service and combat service support capabilities typically required in post

conflict operations. Corps planners possess the knowledge of and experience needed to plan and control joint and multinational operations. Transforming a corps headquarters into a combined joint task force is a METL task. The corps can operate at both the operational and tactical levels of war and can conduct split-based operations when required. In addition, when properly supported, corps can operate in either developed or undeveloped theaters under all physical and climatic environments.<sup>30</sup> These characteristics of the corps suit them well for conducting post conflict operations and perception management.

As such, corps and divisions can employ effective perception management in a post conflict scenario to support the commander. This support can be provided in order to influence foreign populations by expressing information subjectively to influence attitudes and behavior, and to obtain compliance or noninterference. The perception management team advises the commander through the targeting process on psychological actions, targeting restrictions, and potential adverse impacts. Effectively executed, perception management is both a force multiplier and a force protector. It coordinates a credible and unified effort. It can work to improve the trust and confidence of the population in both the US/coalition forces and the host nation government. It can cause the populace to recognize them as a vital part of a democratic society whose support is critical. It can promote the idea of participation in civic affairs. It can raise the spirit of the populace and increase their unity in support of US and host nation efforts. Additionally, the perception management team assists planners by considering the population as the priority targets and advising the commander, through the targeting process, on the application of influence to achieve objectives.

Perception management has been used to varying degrees in several post-Cold War operations. Because the implementation of non-lethal weapon systems has not been standardized or mandated, the successes have varied. NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina provide an

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<sup>30</sup> FM 100-15

insight into the value of perception management and what effective perception management teams can contribute to military operations.

### **Case Study**

Operation Joint Endeavor commenced on December 16, 1995, in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR). The 60,000 -person, 36-nation coalition force entered Bosnia-Herzegovina following the Dayton Peace Agreement which culminated over four years of civil war in BH.<sup>31</sup> The Bosnia civil war had left the former Yugoslav republic in shambles. Civil war had destroyed the majority of the infrastructure including power, water, and communications and the security situation was tenuous. Although the belligerents had been separated, there was still a high level of tension between the former warring factions (FWF) as well as between the FWF and IFOR.

The challenges faced by the Implementation Force, and the actions they took and didn't take, demonstrate the criticality of coordinating the social side of conflict. During Operation Joint Endeavor, adequate information flow and close coordination allowed the commander to use public information and PSYOP as a non-lethal weapon to achieve the commander's intent. Coordinated, accurate, and timely information was one of the commander's major tools to communicate intentions, might, and resolve to the local population and former warring factions. Throughout the operation, commanders made extensive use of information to manage perceptions, help achieve operational goals and implement the military aspects of the Dayton Accords.<sup>32</sup> Information and its conveyance were critical elements of mission accomplishment. The key elements of IFOR's approach were:

- Reliance on information as a non-lethal weapon system
- A coordinated campaign
- Transparent and credible actions

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<sup>31</sup> Wentz, Larry, *Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Washington, DC: CCRP, 1998) 10.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, 443.



The acknowledgement and employment of public information and PSYOP as a non-lethal weapon system to elicit friendly behavior was the central element of the IFOR campaign. "Information was always on the commander's mind as one of his major tools for action."<sup>33</sup> NATO planners realized that Operation Joint Endeavor was a peace operation, and as such, victory would not be determined on the ground but in the media. This led NATO planners to develop and implement a campaign that would both inform and influence the attitudes and behavior of the populace.<sup>34</sup>

An example of employing information to influence behavior without the use of force was a summer 1996 incident with a Serb policeman. "The policeman fired a warning shot at an IFOR soldier and ordered his policemen surround him. In response, COMIFOR approved an information plan to apply gradual pressure on Serbian (RS) leaders to oust the chief of police. In another example, RS leaders refused to let IFOR troops inspect an ammunition depot in Han Pisejak. COMIFOR instructed IFOR spokesperson to recommend that all NGOs pull out of RS since IFOR was about to use lethal force to inspect the depot. After a few days, RS leadership authorized IFOR to carry out its inspection mission."<sup>35</sup>

The public's potential perception of activities was a critical element in all planning activities. Coordination within the IFOR staff was the responsibility of, IFOR's Land Component's Chief Information Officer, Colonel Tim Wilton, UK Army. COL Wilton developed a centralized, coordinated and synchronized process to ensure all messages and information emanating from the staffs at the operational level conformed to the commander's intent, were coherent with one another, and reinforced each other.<sup>36</sup>

In addition, an Information Coordination Group was established. It was chaired by the commander of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (COMARRC) and met daily. Members of the

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 180.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, 179.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, 181.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 175.

group represented a cross section of the staff. They included: the chief of staff, the information officer, the political advisor (POLAD), the civilian media advisor, the public information officer, the IFOR spokesperson, the deputy commander of the information task force, the G-3 and the G-5. Notably absent was the IFOR PSYOP officer, although the decision to use PSYOP or local media was determined at these meetings.

Additionally, the ARRC perception group met weekly to review media trends and determine how best to respond. The difference between the two groups was the absence of the commander and the POLAD in the perception group. Again, the PSYOP officer was not a member. The PSYOP officer was however, a member of the Crisis Planning Group which met only as crises erupted. In the US-led sector, Multinational Division-North (MND-N), the PSYOP officer was a key player, along with the public information officer, civil affairs officer and the G-3 at the Information Operations Council. In the British-led Multinational Division-Southwest (MND-SW) coordination was informal, although the public information officer did attend operational and civil affairs meetings.

In addition to this coordination, collaboration efforts extended beyond the internal mechanisms of IFOR. IFOR planners realized that establishing a mutually supporting relationship with non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations (NGOs & IGOs) would be essential to the successful implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). Getting those organizations to cooperate would prove challenging, though.

As is common in most environments, NGOs are often apprehensive to deal with the military. NGOs fear their association with the military may undermine their credibility because they will not be perceived as impartial. They also fear that if they do associate or cooperate with the military forces their freedom of maneuver, as well as their freedom of speech, may be

thwarted. Cooperation, based on trust, takes time. In the case of IFOR, widespread cooperation with the NGOs did not exist until mid May 1996 six months after operations commenced.<sup>37</sup>

This cooperation resulted in several organizations taking part in the IFOR daily briefings to the media.<sup>38</sup> This created an impression of a united effort in support of the DPA implementation. Eventually, civilian organizations/agencies agreed to chair the briefings three times a week.<sup>39</sup> In addition, IFOR prevented message inaccuracies and conflicts by holding a pre-brief 15 minutes before the daily briefing. Here they decided what information to release and the order of presentation during the press conference was decided. This quick coordination measure prevented redundancy and prevented public disagreements.

The Joint Information Coordination Committee met weekly to inform each coalition member of current activities and plans. According to Captain Van Dyke, USN, IFOR chief public information officer, "during these meetings, everyone shared their latest public information plans and activities, striving to eliminate any potential conflicts in public policies which the former warring factions could then exploit. The corporate experience of the civilian agency spokespersons, and the close personal and professional cooperation that grew between them and IFOR spokespersons, were invaluable to our overall information operations. In return, the civilian agencies benefited greatly from our extensive support agreements."<sup>40</sup>

Despite the success of the IFOR information campaign, there were significant shortcomings in the area of PSYOP coordination and employment. The primary cause of these failures stems from the political sensitivity of psychological operations. Although PSYOP is based in the truth, the term psychological operations conjures up images of manipulation, mind control and state sponsored malice. These misconceptions resulted in PSYOP assets not being employed to their full capacity. This was most extreme in the French controlled Multinational

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 177.

<sup>38</sup> UNHCR, OHR, UNMIBH, OSCE and the World Bank participated

<sup>39</sup> Wentz, 178.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 178.

Division-Southeast (MND-SE) where only one six-man PSYOP detachment was allowed to operate a radio station in Mostar. Additionally, command and control of US PSYOP assets remained under USEUCOM in effect creating two chains of command for product approval; IFOR and EUCOM.

IFOR also had difficulty adapting to the populace's media consumption habits, choosing to rely on print media when the population's preferred medium was television. Additionally, IFOR transmitted on AM and the Bosnians listened primarily to FM radio.<sup>41</sup> Although the information campaign was able to contribute to the initial implementation phase in BH, it was less successful when it came to supporting the civil, economic, and humanitarian side of the operation.<sup>42</sup>

Although it conducted limited perception management activities Operation Joint Endeavor is a good example of how information can be used as a non-lethal weapon system to modify the attitudes and behavior of the populace to gain and maintain support for operations in a post conflict environment. By providing accurate and timely information through a well planned, credible, and coordinated information campaign the commander can use the media and the local populace to accomplish his objectives. An established and adhered to planning model is essential to incorporate these activities in all military operations.

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 416.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, 417.

## Chapter 4

### Perception Management Planning Model

Forming a perception management team at the corps and division level will increase the relevance and readiness of the US Army's operating forces. By reorganizing its combat organizations, the Army will meet the needs and requirements of operating in the current and projected security environment. Forming a perception management team at the corps and division level complies with the guidance of the US Army Chief of Staff to form modular, capabilities based, responsive organizations with the ability to operate decisively in an uncertain environment against an unpredictable threat for extended periods of time.<sup>43</sup> The corps and division perception management team will provide tactical agility, including the ability to reach beyond organic capabilities, for the required effect.<sup>44</sup>

Establishing the perception management team at the corps and division level requires an interdisciplinary approach. A perception management team promotes the collaboration of expertise from across the organization, as well as the expertise of attached and associated elements. The perception management team must be forward leaning, as well as responsive and adaptive. They must leverage the human intangibles by being creative and open-minded, but at the same time follow a methodology, which is rigorously applied, in order to ensure a comprehensive and effective perception management campaign is designed, implemented and assessed. The largest investment is mental, not material. The following perception management model illustrates this mental investment. The model is organized into the following categories: Organization, Research and Analysis, Targeting, Message and Material Development, Implementation and Evaluation.

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<sup>43</sup> Department of the Army, *White Paper The Way Ahead*, March 2004

<sup>44</sup> Ibid

## Organization of the Team

Doctrinally there is no perception management team at the corps or division level. However, it is possible to form one using the expertise organic to the organizational staff, as well as drawing on individuals throughout the command with particular subject matter expertise. The organizational staff of a corps or division does provide the essential core elements of a Perception Management Team. Those elements include the Psychological Operations officer and non-commissioned officer, the Public Affairs officer and non-commissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) and the G-5, Civil Affairs officer. Additional members of the team, based on situation and mission, can include attorneys, broadcast specialists, combat camera attachments, linguists, intelligence personnel, political advisors, chaplains, military police, engineers, organizational soldiers native to the operational area, organizational members who have traveled, worked or studied in the operational area or members of the organization with formal training with the issue at hand. It is essential that the division or corps personnel officer maintain an accurate database of the language abilities and cultural abilities of all assigned soldiers, in order to make their assignment timely and efficient when the need for their experience and expertise arises.

Leadership of the perception management team rests clearly with the only formally trained perception management officer on the staff, the division or corps' psychological operations officer. The division or corps PSYOP officer also has an established connection with other perception managers in the AOR, primarily the JPOTF.<sup>45</sup> He may have access to other operational assets as well, due to his operational experience and relationship with other PSYOP forces in theater and at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The Strategic Studies Detachment, a critical resource for research and analysis of potential target audiences and the Psychological Operations Automated System (POAS) are additional resources the PSYOP officer has access to. This issue

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<sup>45</sup> Currently all active component division and corps PSYOP officers have served a minimum of one tour in the 4<sup>th</sup> Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, NC prior to being assigned to a division or corps. Additionally, they have received military perception management training and language training from the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Some have received advanced degrees in international relations, marketing and communications.

of leadership and responsibility is contentious and requires discussion of the proposed establishment of the corps and division G-7 section and the potential conflicts with the perception management team.

In June 2003, Lieutenant General Riley, Commander, Combined Arms Center, directed the establishment of a G-7 at corps and division levels as a part of Army doctrine. This was an attempt to operationalize information operations. As a result, many assumed that the division and corps Information Operations Section (G-7), would function as the perception management team because the elements of influence; PSYOP, OPSEC and military deception (MD), fall into their proposed responsibility. This however, was an overly ambitious assumption, fraught with shortcomings.

First, information operations are doctrinally too broad in scope to apply the adequate time and resources needed to effectively manage perceptions. The G-7, Information Operations, now has coordinating authority for all elements of Information Operations. Hence, the G-7 is not only concerned with influencing but also destroying, degrading, disrupting, denying, deceiving and exploiting information systems. Information operations and information superiority are his objectives.<sup>46</sup> The G-7 is spread too thin.

Secondly, the G-7 is only an integrating and synchronizing function which crosses many battle staff areas of responsibility. The doctrinal shift of IO to the principal staff is due to the perception that information operations tasks were not being executed within the existing structure when IO functioned as part of the G-3. The fact is, in some cases IO worked well under the old structure, a reflection of the extent it was supported by the G-3.<sup>47</sup> Regardless of where it is placed in structure, IO must still produce a myriad of effects through assets owned and operated by others. Establishment of a G-7 was proposed to give IO more clout on the staff by manning it

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<sup>46</sup> Eassa, Charles LTC, Powerpoint Presentation *G-7 Information Operations Staff Section at Corps and Division (G-7 FDU*, version 05 Feb 04, 13:57 (Ft. Leavenworth: Combined Arms Center, 2004)

<sup>47</sup> Memorandum from C-3 Operations, CJTF-7 to Chief Information Operations, Subject: *Input – G-7 Concept* (26 November 2003)

with a lieutenant colonel (O-5). Its establishment did not increase the capabilities of the corps or division, but actually diminished its influence capability by removing the critical elements from the Operations section (G-3) of the organization and decreasing its integration in all operations.

Finally, information operations officers (FA 30) are not formally trained in perception management, cross cultural communications, the interagency process or marketing. FA 30 officer training consists of two weeks of distance learning and two weeks of resident training at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas during which all the elements of information Operations are briefly covered. In comparison, PSYOP officers at a minimum attend a one-month course on planning and conducting PSYOP, a four-month course in regional studies, and attend a four to six month language program. The majority earns a Masters degree in international relations with an emphasis in political psychology, cross cultural communications and marketing.<sup>48</sup>

#### **Case Study: JTF Perception Management Team**

An example of a successful perception management team formed from within an organizational staff is the team formed during Joint Task Force 160 (Detainee Operations, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, January 2002) to address the issue of a potential death of a detainee. The issue was of particular concern due to the religious and cultural differences of the handling, preparation, and internment of the dead, the international law complexities of allowing access to the deceased before and after internment and the domestic and international implications of the media exploitation of the event.

The JTF Information Operations Officer (Navy O-5) led the perception management team. Team members included the JTF PSYOP officer (Army O-4), Chief of the Joint Information Bureau (Army O-5), JTF Operational Law Attorney (Marine Corps O-5), Mortuary

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<sup>48</sup> Until the advent of the US Army's career field designation process (CFD) all PSYOP designated officers were eligible to attend a Masters degree program prior to their first operational PSYOP assignment. Officers must now be selected for promotion to O-4 and be designated as a career field 39B (Psychological Operations).



Affairs Specialist (Navy E-6), and Muslim Chaplain and AOR native (Navy O-3), JTF Logistics officer (Marine Corps O-4) and JTF Civil Affairs Officer (Army O-4).

The team formed to conduct an initial analysis of the issue. The process used was very similar to mission analysis in the military decision making process. The most salient and difficult aspect of the issue was determining the intent of the JTF commander and deriving the intent of policy makers in Washington, DC. Assets, resources available and constraints were identified. Acceptable risk was established and JTF and US vulnerabilities were reviewed. An assessment of adversaries or any other actor who would potentially exploit the issue was conducted and their resources and courses of action identified.

Following the initial analysis, three members of the command, native to AOR, were asked to join the team and offer their perspectives on the courses of action. The three members averaged four to seventeen years out of the operational area in question. All were practicing Muslims. Their insights provided the necessary credibility to develop and more importantly, sell, a plan to the commander which would be both acceptable to the US government and military, while at the same time respecting the cultural and religious practices of the deceased. Finally, JTF courses of action, complete with implications and tasks were delivered to the commander for selection.<sup>49</sup>

### **Research and Analysis**

The foundation of an integrated, synchronized, coordinated, and coherent perception management campaign is thorough research and analysis. Perception management planners gather influence-relevant information to develop an understanding of select countries, regions, and target audiences. This information is gathered to develop an understanding of target audience (TA)<sup>50</sup> behavior, culture, thought process, belief systems, and motivational factors, which is used

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<sup>49</sup> The author served as the Joint Task Force 160 PSYOP Officer during Operation Enduring Freedom January – April 2002.

<sup>50</sup> Target Audience - An individual or group selected for influence or attack by means of psychological operations.(JP 1-02)

to develop initial perception management objectives. Developing a thorough and current knowledge of the political, military, economic, cultural, psychological, and social conditions allows planners to develop persuasive psychological actions. Intelligence provides this knowledge.<sup>51</sup> In addition to raw intelligence, finished studies and other sources are also used including basic PSYOP studies, special PSYOP studies, INTSUMs, host nation sources, open sources, and interviews.

### **Political-Military Factors**

No single factor is sufficient to understand the psychological dimension of the mission.<sup>52</sup> As such, special operations forces use the political-military analytical framework to gain an understanding of their operational environment, referred to as an Analysis of the Operational Environment (AOE). It is an analytical tool suited for conventional units as well. The political-military factors and the elements essential to corps and division planners follow.

- **History** – History not only provides an understanding of the past, but can also assist in making predictions for the future. How has the populace behaved in the past? Are there predictable patterns of behavior? Are there significant events in history which remain significant for the populace today? Why? Does the populace view their history the same way outsiders do? Has there been military intervention in the past? How has it been perceived?

- **Natural Environment** – Understanding the natural environment and its impact on the population provides insight into why things are as they are. Does terrain divide or unite the population? Does the terrain limit communication and interaction? Does it compartmentalize perspectives?

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<sup>51</sup> FM 3-05.3, *Psychological Operations*, 10-1.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid*, 10-1.

• **Cultural Environment**<sup>53</sup> – This is the most intangible element and often the hardest to understand. Understanding this component will provide insight into the shared values, attitudes and beliefs of a society. It will also provide an understanding of the role of the family. It will provide an understanding of “time.” How is time seen? Is it an efficient, prompt culture? Is it a “whenever” culture?

• **Political System** – Understanding the existing political system is essential to a perception management campaign promoting the legitimacy of the host nation government in a post conflict environment. In order to improve popular support for the government it is essential to understand the government’s role prior to the conflict. Additionally, it is essential to be aware of past issues with the government in order to counter pre-existing notions about the government.

• **Political Economy** – How are politics and the economy interconnected in the society? Has the conflict changed that? Economic strength will effect how the populace perceives the government as well as how international audiences perceive the government. The strength of the economy and its ability establish a defense force and influence regional actors will dictate the length of US/coalition involvement.

• **Role of the Military** – Understanding the role of the military pre-hostilities is essential to understanding how the populace perceives the military post conflict. Promoting the legitimacy of the military is essential to establishing a secure and stable environment, and therefore promoting the legitimacy of the host nation government.

• **Ideology** –Ideology is political. It is an essential element in any society’s value system and it serves to strengthen and unite the entire community or a select group. It is directed at the masses and provides a perspective of the present and a view of the future. Ideology may be the source of the original conflict and as such is a volatile aspect of the post conflict environment.

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<sup>53</sup> An excellent, easy to use basic culture guide is the CULTUREGRAM Series produced by Brigham Young University

• **Religion** – What religions are present and what religion is prevalent? How orthodox or devote are the religion's followers? Most importantly what is the effect religion has on political, social, and economic aspects. Is it religious nationalism or a secular state? What are the roles of religious leaders? What was their stature prior to the conflict? Has it remained the same?

• **Foreign Influence** – In an increasing era of the "coalition of the willing" understanding foreign influence is especially important to understanding the political-military environment. Influence may be direct or indirect and may display itself in the form of military assets, immigration, and economic policies.

• **Leadership** – Analyzing the official and informal leadership, as well as key communicators, within a society is essential to developing an effective targeting template. Understanding how the leadership uses fears, motivations and resources to mobilize the populace is necessary to developing a plan to influence the influencer. Understanding their decision making process and getting inside that process will prove critical to a successful influence campaign.

• **Regional Perspective** - Are there regional organizations which will impact perception management activities? Are there activities beyond the AOR which will impact perception management within the AOR?

• **National Interests** – Planners must understand the self-interests of the population and the nation from the host nation's perspective.

• **Ethnicity** – Is there an ethnic division within the society? Will this division prove detrimental to US actions? Do ethnic differences transcend all other aspects? Will separate campaigns need to be developed to address divergent ethnic groups?

• **Role of the Media** – Understanding the media consumption patterns of the population is essential to delivering effective messages. What sources does the population deem more credible? Print media, radio or television? If radio, AM or FM? Is the media viewed as

independent and credible or is it a mouthpiece of the government? Is the media favorable towards US activities or is it anti-American or anti-West?

Planners must not only describe each of these, *what*, but more importantly they must understand the *why*. They must understand the influence these factors have on the society. The perception management team must fully understand the composition of the civilian, military and government populations within the area in which they are operating. They must recognize the attitudes of the society that they are trying to influence. They must understand the societal trends and the forces that are shaping the society. They must develop a comprehension of the concerns of the society or audience from the perspective of the audience and they must reconcile the objectives of the corps or division with those concerns.

These are not easy tasks and require a great deal of detailed research and empathy to accomplish them effectively. In addition to the aforementioned elements, it is also essential to know the methods of communications used in the society, both formal and informal. Formal, referring to broadcast and print media, and informal, referring to face-to-face communication among family, friends, and community leaders. Understanding the reach and effectiveness of the formal communications network is especially important in a more advanced society where media plays a role much like in the US. However, regardless of the level of modernity or the sophistication of the target audience, face-to-face communication with a trusted and respected family member or key communicator has the greatest credibility.

Collection of information is intensive, but analysis is critical. The analysis phase identifies targets and ties tactical and operational goals and objectives to specific target audiences. Segmenting the target audience and identifying key communicators is the first step in identifying targets.

### **Targeting**

The cornerstone of an effective and enduring perception management campaign is a well developed, flexible, and adaptive targeting process. Developing your targeting strategy lays the

foundation of your perception management campaign. Targeting matches the commander's objectives, guidance, and intent from each component and staff element to identify forces and effects necessary to achieve the objectives.<sup>54</sup> Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities.<sup>55</sup> Although inherently non-kinetic and non-lethal, perception management is a weapon system and as such must be treated like all other targeting activities in the corps and division.

To maintain a common frame of reference, perception management planners must use the same targeting processes and terminology used by other planners with whom they work. Joint Pub 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting*, provides that common frame of reference. Just as in traditional kinetic targeting, the perception management targeting process must coordinate, de-conflict, prioritize, synchronize, integrate, and assess targeting operations.

According to JP 3-60, a target is an area, complex, installation, force, equipment, capability, function, or behavior identified for possible action to support the commander's objectives, guidance, and intent.<sup>56</sup> In perception management a target is an attitude, belief, value, and eventual behavior of an individual or group. Targets fall in to two categories, planned and immediate. Planned targets are a result of the deliberate planning cycle and have been analyzed, developed and incorporated into a scheduled perception management campaign to generate sequential, and often simultaneous, desired effects. Immediate targets are not scheduled into the perception management campaign. They are targets of opportunity. The situational awareness, constant evaluation, flexibility, and adaptability of the perception management team are essential to identifying and exploiting both of these types of targets. Targets are further characterized as

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<sup>54</sup> US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-60, *Joint Doctrine for Targeting* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2002) v.

<sup>55</sup> JP 1-02

<sup>56</sup> JP 3-60, I-2

high-value targets (HVTs), critical to the success of the enemy, and high-payoff targets (HPTs), critical to the success of friendly operations.

Adhering to the principles of targeting throughout the perception management campaign ensures desired effects are achieved while diminishing undesired or collateral consequences.<sup>57</sup> The targeting process must remain focused on achieving the objectives. It must be effects based, seeking to achieve desired effects with the least risk, time, and expenditure of resources. It must be interdisciplinary, drawing on the expertise of all elements of the perception management team and it must be systematic, using a rigorously applied methodology that analyzes, prioritizes, delivers, and assesses.

Effects based targeting for perception management is accomplished through a comprehensive nodal analysis. Nodal analysis provides a graphic depiction of all desired effects, the perception management targets and their interconnectedness. This link analysis will show who influences who so that assets can be leveraged to achieve operational objectives.<sup>58</sup> These analyses assist in determining the second and third order effects, as well as preventing duplication of effort.

This systematic approach to targeting will establish the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the target audiences to be exploited. One method is the CARVER method. The CARVER matrix is an effective method of targeting used by special operations forces that can be modified to conduct perception management target analysis. The components of the method are criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect and recognizability.

**Criticality.** Criticality, or target value, is the primary consideration. It refers to how much its execution will alter the competitor, adversary or local populace's attitudes, beliefs and behavior.

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid, I-4

<sup>58</sup> Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Task Force Eagle Information Operations* (Ft. Leavenworth: CALL Newsletter No. 03-18, Jun 03) 7.

**Accessibility.** How accessible is the target? Does the target require a direct or indirect attack? If indirect through what or who must the target be accessed? What method, medium and delivery means will be more effective?

**Recuperability.** If changed, how long can the attitude, belief, or behavior be expected to remain consistent without reinforcement? What reinforcement will be required?

**Vulnerability.** What is the degree of vulnerability? Will the objective be achieved?

**Effect.** The target should only be attacked if the desired psychological effects will be achieved. The likely unintended consequences must be calculated and weighed against the benefits. Will the attack be lawful under the current rules of engagement (ROE) and laws of land warfare?

**Recognizability.** Can the target be easily accessed and not confused with other targets or neutral elements? Will the desired effect of the attack be readily apparent? Will the targeting efforts be transparent or easily recognized by the target or other audiences? Will this recognition effect the credibility and legitimacy of the mission?

### **Message and Material Development**

Once analysis is conducted and targets have been identified, messages and materials must be developed. Messages must be specific to each target audience. The desired behavioral change must be clearly addressed to help the target audience visualize new futures. Message development must think in the long term to ensure that resources are available to repeat and reinforce the messages. There is a need to step outside the conventional boundaries in both message development and product development.

Once the message has been determined it is then necessary to develop the product or design the action that will deliver the intended message. Effective material selection requires the perception management team synthesize what they have learned about the target audience. Material selection is especially critical for operations at the corps and division due to resource limitations and budgetary constraints. Corps and divisions do not have the organic assets to



produce sophisticated broadcast and print media products in mass quantities. If resources allow, divisions and corps should plan to purchase media and print services in the host nation.

### **Implementation**

Developing an implementation plan begins by identifying channels. These channels establish how the ideas will be conveyed to the target audience. The more channels that are identified and developed, the greater the chances of the message reaching the target audience. Different channels will be developed for different types of products and actions. Additionally, a method for tracking and evaluating the plan must be developed and in place prior to the plan being implemented.

A key element to implementation is language. As anyone who has ever encountered a language barrier can attest, language is a powerful, complex and essential tool for communicating. Language is essential to perception management. It is both informative and affective.<sup>59</sup> The informative aspect is one of definition and denotation. The affective aspect is the use of verbal expressions to elicit a connotation.<sup>60</sup> It is through language that we communicate needs, desires, and feelings. Language also elicits behavior, both desired and undesired.

Language is extremely complex and more than the spoken word. It is composed of many non-verbal aspects which are often more significant or truthful than the actual spoken words. Each culture has its own "language of space", locomotion, sitting, standing and gestures.<sup>61</sup> Having a clear understanding of and respect for non-verbal language is key to experiencing a different culture. Body language or gestures can tell us a lot about a situation. Non-verbal cues such as facial expressions indicate the listener's attitude and receptivity.

Understanding the complexity and importance of language is critical in post conflict operations. Knowing how words, gestures and actions will be perceived will help achieve desired results. By understanding the many verbal and non-verbal aspects of language in a cultural

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<sup>59</sup> S.I. Hayakawa, *Language in Thought and Action* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1990) 43.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid 44

<sup>61</sup> Edward Hall, *Beyond Culture* (New York: Doubleday, 1989) 75.

context, soldiers are able to communicate more effectively and facilitate the achievement of post conflict objectives.

### **Evaluation**

Designing evaluation criteria or measures of effectiveness (MOE) is difficult but essential to designing and implementing a perception management campaign. Measures of effectiveness are a prerequisite to assessment and evaluation. MOE must be quantifiable. The objective must be a measurable and discernable change in attitude or behavior. Once perception management objectives have been established, MOE to support those objectives must also be established. The approved MOE are in place prior to the implementation of a perception management campaign in order to objectively evaluate the effectiveness of the campaign.

Although perception management objectives and MOE must be established prior to the initiation of a campaign, over time they will need to be re-addressed and likely modified. Perception management deals with the human element of military operations and as such will change and evolve on a continuing basis. Planners must remain cognizant of this in order to continue to execute an operationally relevant campaign.

The perception management planning model, when employed, provides an essential element to planning, integrating and executing post conflict operations. Through a tailored organization, in-depth research, insightful analysis, nodal analysis and targeting, effective messages can be developed. Through a well integrated dissemination and evaluation plan these messages can be delivered to the target audiences to achieve the desired behavior.

## **Chapter Five**

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

In order for corps and divisions to be effective and achieve lasting, measurable results in a post-conflict environment they must establish a secure environment, foster the legitimacy of the host nation government and restore essential services and infrastructure, while simultaneously generating goodwill and protecting the forces. In order to accomplish these objectives, division and corps commanders must master the art and science of managing perceptions by employing influence operations as a weapon system. When military force is no longer the compelling element, information and its communication to the target audience becomes a primary weapon. The effective management of the perceptions of the populace can account for significant advances in the commander's goals. Conversely, disregard for or mismanagement of perceptions can lead to unintended consequences or mission failure.

Due to the wide variety of mission profiles, forming a perception management team at the corps and division level with a standing core element will increase the relevance and readiness of the US Army's operating forces. By reorganizing appropriate staff assets, and achieving the correct mix based on the unique requirements of a specific mission or environment, the commander will be able to achieve the full effects of perception management. The corps and division perception management team will provide tactical agility, including the ability to reach beyond organic capabilities for the required effects.

In addition to the planning, integration and assessment of the perception management program, several other actions must take place in order to achieve the maximum effectiveness of military operations in a post conflict environment. First, planners must consider perception management as an available non-lethal weapon system during the planning of post conflict operations. The focus of operations must be on gaining the support of the populace, leveraging interagency and additional assets and producing a unity of effort. Planners must use the same

operational planning tools, but frame them in a political, cultural, religious, and historical context as they use when planning combat operations.

The importance of perception management cannot be left solely to the planners. Commanders at all levels must ensure that every soldier is a warrior-diplomat in a post conflict environment. Soldiers must be aware that every action they take or fail to take will have an impact on the attitudes and actions of the population they are interacting with. Additionally, due to the nature of the global media environment, the consequences may be grossly disproportional to the action. Soldiers must be trained in interpersonal skills, cultural awareness, negotiating techniques and key language phrases. These non-traditional skills must be honed while at the same time maintaining combat skills that could be required at any moment during post conflict operations. The organizational staff must track these skills, along with others, in order to leverage organic assets against specific mission requirements.

A consolidated database of all language capabilities and cultural experience of assigned soldiers must be maintained with the personnel officer (G-1). The language capabilities and cultural experiences of assigned personnel are an often untapped resource. Maintaining a database will provide planners with an invaluable resource when planning operations. Inputting and updating the database can easily be a part of in-processing and regularly scheduled soldier readiness checks. The database should also contain the area of concentration for those with academic degrees.

Establishing a perception management team at the corps and division level is feasible, suitable, and acceptable. It is feasible to establish a perception management team while remaining within the constraints of the transformational Army. Forming the perception management team is a reorganization of staff personnel to address the behavioral analysis aspect of mission requirements. It is not the creation of additional positions in the corps and division headquarters. It is simply a fundamental change in the approach to planning operations. The

current global security environment dictates a responsive and flexible approach. A matrixed team with a core staff element will provide this.

It is an acceptable interdisciplinary approach that will provide operationally relevant analytical products to the commander, planners, targeteers and operators. The perception management team will provide value added with no costs. The investment is mental, not material.

The perception management team is suitable because it provides organizational agility by being modular and capabilities based. It focuses on the human intangibles of military operations that have often been ignored. It provides a framework to integrate echelon above corps assets into corps and division perception management planning and will increase the operational effectiveness of military operations in a post conflict environment.

In a post conflict environment the attitudes and behavior of the populace are a decisive factor. A perception management team will be a key enabler to ensuring the attitudes and behaviors of the populace are favorable towards achieving US objectives.

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